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I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys significant developments in intellectual property
(IP) law during the past year (2015 or the Survey period).1 This article
reviews IP law developments that are likely to be influential in the evolu-
tion of Texas IP jurisprudence. Thus, the cases cited focus on the deci-
sions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. For developments in copyright and trademark law, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s authority is binding.2 Other
circuits, such as the Second Circuit, are considered highly persuasive.3
Decisions from the Federal Circuit during the Survey period are included
in this article because all cases concerning a substantive issue of patent
law are appealed to that court.4
The Supreme Court was quite active in the IP field since the last Survey
period (2014) ended, deciding five cases involving IP issues5 and granting
writs of certiorari on two others.6 In patents, the Supreme Court showed
particular interest in whether a patent owner may collect a royalty on a
patent after the patent expires.7 The Supreme Court also considered
whether an infringer’s good-faith belief in the invalidity of a patent is a
defense to induced infringement.8 In addition, the Supreme Court deter-
mined what standard of review the Federal Circuit should apply when
reviewing claim construction rulings.9 The Federal Circuit also made im-
portant developments to its patent law jurisprudence.10
1. The views expressed in this article are the views of the individual authors and are
not necessarily those of Haynes and Boone, LLP, its attorneys, or any of its clients.
2. See S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
3. See id.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
5. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2405 (2015); Commil v. Cisco Sys.,
135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (2015); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835
(2015), B & B Hardware, Inc., v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015), Hana
Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 911 (2015).
6. See Stryker Corp v. Zimmer, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 356 (2015); Halo Elec. v. Pulse Elec.,
136 S. Ct. 356 (2015).
7. See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2405.
8. See Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1928.
9. See Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 835.
10. See Akamai Tech. v. Limelight Networks, 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Intellec-
tual Ventures v. Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Carnegie Mellon Univ.
v. Marvell Tech., 807 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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In copyright, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided
whether Google’s scanning, storage, and display of millions of books falls
within the “fair use” defense to copyright infringement.11 The Second
Circuit also determined that music publishers could not selectively offer
blanket licenses covering their music libraries to negotiate for better roy-
alty rates from new media platforms, such as Pandora.12
In trademark, the Supreme Court found that a district court could
make a finding of issue preclusion grounded in a prior agency decision.13
The Federal Circuit held a provision of the Lanham Act, which allows the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to deny a trade-
mark registration on the basis that the applied-for mark would disparage
a group of people, unconstitutional under the First Amendment.14
II. PATENT UPDATE
A. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT ON PATENTS
1. The Web of Patent Royalties Does Not Extend Beyond the
Expiration of the Patent—Kimble v. Marvel
In Kimble v. Marvel, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether to
continue to uphold the Brulotte rule that a “patent holder cannot charge
royalties for the use of his invention after its patent term has expired.”15
Stephen Kimble owns the patent at issue (U.S. 5,072,856), which covers
a toy that allows the user to spray “pressurized foam string” from “the
palm of [the] hand” to mimic “a spider person.”16 Kimble sued Marvel
Entertainment (Marvel) for patent infringement. The parties reached a
settlement agreement, which required Marvel to “purchase Kimble’s pat-
ent in exchange for a lump sum (of about a half-million dollars) and a 3%
royalty on Marvel’s future sales of the [toy] and similar products.”17
There was no end-date for the royalty on Marvel’s future sales.18 After
the settlement, Marvel found Brulotte, which held that “a patent holder
cannot charge royalties for the use of his invention after its patent term
has expired.”19
Marvel went to federal district court to seek a declaratory judgment,
“confirming that the company could cease paying royalties” once the pat-
ent term ended.20 The district court held that “Brulotte made ‘the royalty
provision . . . unenforceable after the expiration of the Kimble patent.’”21
11. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2015).
12. See Pandora Media, Inc., v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 785
F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2015).
13. See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015).
14. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
15. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2405 (2015).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2406.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2405–06.
20. Id. at 2406.
21. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the holding, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.22
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Kimble argued that the Brulotte rule
should be abandoned “in favor of ‘flexible, case-by-case analysis’ of post-
expiration royalty clauses ‘under the rule of reason.’”23
The Supreme Court did not agree, finding that stare decisis prohibited
it from overruling Brulotte because there was no “superspecial justifica-
tion.”24 It held that a “patent holder cannot charge royalties for the use of
his invention after its patent term has expired.”25
The principle of stare decisis is “the idea that today’s Court should
stand by yesterday’s decisions . . . [and] is a ‘foundation stone of the rule
of law.’”26 Furthermore, “stare decisis carries enhanced force when a de-
cision . . . interprets a statute.”27 In this case, Brulotte interpreted the
statutory term of a patent in finding that royalties cannot go beyond the
patent term.28 The Supreme Court noted that in cases of statutory inter-
pretation, Congress may make corrections to the statute at issue.29 It spe-
cifically focused on the fact that “Congress has repeatedly amended the
patent laws, including the specific provision on which Brulotte rested” but
never actually reworked the Brulotte rule.30
The Supreme Court also found that where property (patents) and con-
tract rights (licensing agreements) are at issue, under stare decisis, there
needs to be a superspecial justification to reverse Brulotte.31 Here, there
was no superspecial justification because “Brulotte’s statutory and doctri-
nal underpinnings have not eroded over time” and “nothing about Bru-
lotte has proved unworkable.”32 The Supreme Court noted, “[T]he core
feature of the patent laws on which Brulotte relied remains just the same:
Section 154 now, as then, draws a sharp line cutting off patent rights after
a set number of years.”33 There is an “ease of use” when applying the
Brulotte rule because, for example, “[a] court need only ask whether a
licensing agreement provides royalties for post-expiration use of a
patent.”34
The Supreme Court also noted that there were several ways to work
around Brulotte.35 First, licensees can “defer payments for pre-expiration
use of a patent into the post-expiration period.”36 Second, “royalties may
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2409.
24. Id. at 2410.
25. Id. at 2405.
26. Id. at 2409.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2405.
29. Id. at 2413.
30. Id. at 2410.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2410–11.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2411.
35. Id. at 2408.
36. Id.
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run until the latest-running patent covered in the parties’ agreement ex-
pires.”37 Third, “post-expiration royalties are allowable so long as tied to
a non-patent right—even when closely related to a patent.”38 Fourth,
there is “no bar to business arrangements other than royalties . . . that
enable parties to share the risks and rewards of commercializing an
invention.”39
Three Justices dissented, noting that Brulotte was “baseless and damag-
ing precedent,” and that “[a] licensing agreement that provides for the
payment of royalties after a patent’s term expires does not enlarge the
patentee’s monopoly or extend the term of the patent. It simply gives the
licensor a contractual right.”40 The dissent argued that the “[Patent] Act
says nothing whatsoever about post-expiration royalties,” but that the Su-
preme Court in Brulotte “held that such royalties are per se unlawful.”41
Additionally, the dissent argued that Brulotte “often functions to upset
the parties’ expectations” because “[i]f the parties had been aware of
Brulotte, they might have agreed to higher payments during the patent
term.”42
The Supreme Court’s ruling shows that the way for Brulotte to change
is through action by Congress.
2. Invalidity is Not a Defense to Infringement; It is a Defense to
Liability—Commil v. Cisco
The question before the U.S. Supreme Court in Commil v. Cisco was
“whether a defendant’s belief regarding patent validity is a defense to a
claim of induced infringement.”43 Section 271(b) of the Patent Act out-
lines induced infringement.44
The patent at issue related to “a method of providing faster and more
reliable communications between devices and base stations” in short-
range wireless networks.45 Cisco “makes and sells wireless networking
equipment.”46 Commil sued Cisco in the district court, alleging that Cisco
“infringed Commil’s patent by making and using networking equipment”
and that “Cisco had induced others to infringe the patent by selling the
infringing equipment for them to use.”47 Cisco raised the defense that it
“had a good-faith belief that Commil’s patent was invalid.”48 The district




40. Id. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2417.
43. Commil v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (2015).
44. Id. at 1926.




49. Id. at 1925.
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Cisco argued that the jury instruction stating that it could be liable for
induced infringement if Cisco “‘knew or should have known’ that its cus-
tomers infringed” was improper because the jury instruction “did not
state knowledge as the governing standard for inducement liability.”50
The Federal Circuit held that the jury instruction was incorrect, and “that
induced infringement ‘requires knowledge that the induced acts consti-
tute patent infringement’” because the jury instruction would have al-
lowed “the jury to find [Cisco] liable based on mere negligence where
knowledge is required.”51
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the judgment of the Fed-
eral Circuit.52 The Supreme Court held that a “defendant’s belief regard-
ing patent validity is not a defense to a claim of induced infringement”53
because “infringement and invalidity are separate matters under patent
law.”54
Infringement and invalidity are “separate matters under patent law”
for several reasons.55 First, they are “listed as two separate defenses” in
the Patent Act.56 Defendants may raise a defense of non-infringement,
invalidity, or both.57 Second, the clear and convincing standard, which is
applied when overcoming the presumption that a patent is valid, would
be reduced if a “defendant could prevail if he proved he reasonably be-
lieved the patent was invalid.”58 Third, “invalidity is not a defense to in-
fringement it is a defense to liability.”59 Invalidity can be used to
“preclude enforcement of a patent against otherwise infringing conduct,”
but if a patent is invalid, “there is no liability.”60
The Supreme Court also noted policy reasons supporting its holding.61
First, there are many proper ways for accused inducers to obtain a ruling
that the patent actually is invalid (such as an inter partes review).62 Addi-
tionally, if belief of invalidity was a defense, it could “render litigation
more burdensome for everyone involved,” raise discovery costs, and re-
quire the jury to “be put to the difficult task of separating the defendant’s
belief regarding validity from the actual issue of validity.”63 Finally, the
Supreme Court stated that “[t]he general rule that ignorance of the law
or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted
in the American legal system.”64
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1931.
53. Id. at 1922.
54. Id. at 1928.
55. Id. at 1928–29.
56. Id. at 1928.




61. Id. at 1929–30.
62. Id. at 1929.
63. Id. at 1929–30.
64. Id. at 1930.
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There were two dissenting Justices, who noted that, “[b]ecause only
valid patents can be infringed, anyone with a good-faith belief in a pat-
ent’s invalidity necessarily believes that the patent cannot be infringed.
And it is impossible for anyone who believes that a patent cannot be
infringed to induce actions that he knows will infringe it.”65
3. Clear Error or De Novo Review for Claim Construction—It is a
Question of Fact—Teva v. Sandoz
In Teva v. Sandoz, the U.S. Supreme Court determined “what standard
the Court of Appeals should use when it reviews a trial judge’s resolution
of an underlying factual dispute” during claim construction.66
Teva’s patent “covers a manufacturing method for Copaxone, a drug
used to treat multiple sclerosis.”67 Teva sued Sandoz, Inc. (Sandoz) for
patent infringement when it tried to sell a generic version of Copaxone.
Sandoz argued that the patent claim phrase “molecular weight” was inva-
lid on the basis of indefiniteness because it does not specify how the mo-
lecular weight is calculated.68
The district court held the patent valid because it found the claims to
be sufficiently definite.69 The Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s
claim construction de novo and found that the patent was invalid because
the term was indefinite.70 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.71
The Supreme Court held that “[w]hen reviewing a district court’s reso-
lution of subsidiary factual matters” during patent construction, “the Fed-
eral Circuit must apply a ‘clear error,’ not a de novo, standard of review”
because of Rule 52(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.72 Rule
52(a)(6) requires a court of appeals to use a “clearly erroneous” standard
of review for a fact finding.73 The Supreme Court noted that “[e]ven if
exceptions to the Rule were permissible, we cannot find any convincing
ground for creating an exception to that Rule here.”74
The Supreme Court clarified that the Markman decision did not “cre-
ate[ ], nor argue[ ] for, an exception to Rule 52(a).”75 The Supreme Court
held in Markman that “the ultimate question of claim construction is for
the judge and not the jury.”76 Markman did not “create an exception to
Rule 52(a)” because claim construction is not a “factual matter[ ],” even
though “subsidiary factfinding is sometimes necessary.”77 It also noted
65. Id. at 1931 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 835–36.
69. Id. at 831, 836.
70. Id. at 836.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 833.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 837.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 838.
77. Id.
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that Rule 52(a) “requires appellate courts to review all such subsidiary
factual findings under the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard.”78
The Supreme Court also explained how the clear error rule should be
applied by distinguishing between cases of claim construction where the
judge’s determination is reviewed de novo or for clear error on appeal.79
Patent claims, specifications, and prosecution history are all intrinsic to
the patent and should be reviewed de novo.80 Other evidence used to
assist in understanding the “background science or the meaning of a term
in the relevant art during the relevant time period” is extrinsic evidence
and should be reviewed for clear error.81
There were two dissenting justices who noted that “‘Rule 52(a) does
not furnish particular guidance with respect to distinguishing law from
fact,’ and we have found it difficult to discern ‘any other rule or principle
that will unerringly’ differentiate the two.”82
B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ON PATENTS
1. Applying the Supreme Court Precedent to § 271(a)—Akamai v.
Limelight
In Akamai v. Limelight, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit faced the same case after the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the
case, noting “the possibility that [the Federal Circuit] erred by too nar-
rowly circumscribing the scope of § 271(a).”83
Akamai owns multiple patents covering “methods for delivering con-
tent over the Internet.”84 It filed a patent infringement action against
Limelight.85 Both parties agreed that it was not Limelight, but Limelight’s
customers who “perform[ed] the ‘tagging’ and ‘serving’ steps in the
claims.”86
The Federal Circuit held Limelight liable for direct infringement be-
cause “substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that all steps of the
claimed methods were performed by or attributable to Limelight.”87 An
entity will now be held “responsible for others’ performance of method
steps in two sets of circumstances: (1) where that entity directs or controls
others’ performance; and (2) where the actors form a joint enterprise.”88
The Federal Circuit noted that, in addition to “general principals of vica-
rious liability . . . liability under § 271(a) can also be found when an al-
leged infringer conditions participation in an activity or steps of a
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 841.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 844 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
83. Akamai Tech. v. Limelight Networks, 797 F.3d 1020, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
84. Id. at 1024.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1025.
88. Id. at 1022.
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patented method and establishes the manner or timing of that perform-
ance.”89 Simply put, the test for direct infringement is to “consider
whether all method steps can be attributed to a single entity.”90
The Federal Circuit found two pieces of “substantial evidence from
which [a jury] could find that Limelight directs or controls its customers’
performance of each remaining method step, such that all steps of the
method are attributable to Limelight.”91 First, Limelight’s customers sign
a contract, which outlines the “steps customers must perform if they use
the Limelight service.”92 For example, “tagging and serving” are among
the steps involved.93 Second, “Limelight sends it customers a welcome
letter instructing the customer how to use Limelight’s service.”94 The in-
structions include “step-by-step instructions” on how to tag and serve
content.95 Thus, Limelight is liable for direct infringement because its
customers “can only avail themselves of . . . [Limelight’s] service upon
their performance of the method steps.”96
2. No “Inventive Concept” under Alice—Intellectual Ventures v.
Capital One Bank
In the Alice portion of Intellectual Ventures v. Capital One Bank, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found two examples of ab-
stract ideas that lack an “inventive concept” under Alice.97 Intellectual
Ventures claimed that Capital One infringed its patents (U.S. Patent Nos.
8,083,137 (the ‘137 patent) and 7,603,382 (the ‘382 patent)).98 The district
court found that both patents claimed “ineligible subject matter and were
also indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).”99 Intellectual Ventures
appealed.100
Using the recent Alice framework, the Federal Circuit found that both
patents claimed unpatentable subject matter because they claimed an ab-
stract idea lacking an inventive concept.101 There are two steps in the
Alice framework for determining “whether an invention claims ineligible
subject matter.”102 The first step is to “‘determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to one of [the] patent-ineligible concepts’—laws of na-
ture, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”103 The second step states
that if a patent is for an abstract idea, the court should “ask whether the
89. Id. at 1022–23.
90. Id. at 1023.




95. Id. at 1025.
96. Id.
97. Intellectual Ventures v. Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
98. Id. at 1365.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1365, 1368, 1370.
102. Id. at 1366.
103. Id.
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remaining elements, either in isolation or combination with the non-pat-
ent-ineligible elements, are sufficient to ‘“transform the nature of the
claim” into a patent-eligible application.’”104 More specifically, “there
must be an ‘inventive concept’ to take the claim into the realm of patent-
eligibility.”105
The ‘137 patent is connected with budgeting, specifically, “tracking fi-
nancial transactions to determine whether they exceed a pre-set spending
limit,” using a “communication medium.”106 The Federal Circuit found
that the communication medium limitation is not enough to “render the
claims any less abstract.”107 There was no inventive concept because all of
the elements were “generic computer elements,” such as “a database, a
user profile . . . and a communication medium.”108 The Federal Circuit
referenced Alice, stating, “Instructing one to ‘apply’ an abstract idea and
reciting no more than generic computer elements performing generic
computer tasks does not make an abstract idea patent-eligible.”109
The ‘382 patent in Intellectual Ventures is for “customizing web page
content as a function of navigation history and information known about
the user.”110 The patent owner argued that there is an inventive concept
because the “claimed invention in ‘real time’ customizes the web page
based on the information it knows about the particular viewer.”111 The
patent owner admitted that “the web site might have a series of pre-de-
signed advertisements, which, based on the user’s information, the web
site would then choose between and present to the user.”112 The Federal
Circuit found that the invention did not cover patent eligible subject mat-
ter because the “minimal tailoring” is an abstract idea lacking an inven-
tive concept.113 The Federal Circuit cited Alice and stated, “Steps that do
nothing more than spell out what it means to ‘apply it on a compuer’
cannot confer patent-eligibility.”114 Specifically, “the use of a ‘software’
‘brain’ ‘tasked with tailoring information and providing it to the user’
provides no additional limitation beyond applying an abstract idea, re-
stricted to the Internet, on a generic computer.”115
Alice is currently having a significant impact on the patentable subject
matter of patents and warrants careful practitioner attention. The Alice
effect highlights the importance of meticulous drafting to comply with
statutory requirements, especially § 112, and claiming in sufficient detail
the features of the invention.
104. Id. at 1366–67.
105. Id. at 1367.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1368.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1369.
111. Id. at 1370.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1369–70.
114. Id. at 1370.
115. Id. at 1371.
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3. Extraterritoriality and Royalties—Carnegie Mellon University v.
Marvell
In Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell, one of the questions that the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered involved the
issue of extraterritoriality.116 Specifically, the Federal Circuit considered
whether the royalty awarded by the district court “improperly reaches
beyond United States borders.”117
Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) owns U.S. Patent Nos. 6,201,839
and 6,438,180, which are directed towards the “magnetic data-storage me-
dia of hard-disk drives in computers.”118 Marvell “designs and sells semi-
conductor microchips” in California and “hires foreign companies to
manufacture them.”119 CMU sued Marvell in a patent infringement claim
because Marvell used CMU’s patents in developing its new generation of
chips.120 Marvell has sold 2,338,380,542 chips based around the designs
disclosed in the patents.121
At trial, the jury found Marvell guilty of infringement and granted an
award of $1,169,140,271 to CMU as a reasonable royalty, based on a “50-
cents-per-chip royalty.”122 Additionally, the district court increased the
award by $79,550,288 in order to account for Marvell’s profits up to the
date of the judgment, earned from its continued sales of the chips at is-
sue.123 The district court also raised the damages by 23%, which ulti-
mately added another $287,198,828.60 to the award.124 Marvell
appealed.125
Marvell argued that “the award improperly include[d] ‘foreign chips in
the royalty base.’”126 It further claimed that “the district court ‘erred in
denying JMOL (and new trial or remittitur) striking the portion of the
damages award that rested on sales of foreign chips that were manufac-
tured, sold, and used abroad without ever entering the United States.’”127
The Federal Circuit, however, was not persuaded by Marvell’s argu-
ment, noting that § 271(a) “states a clear definition of what conduct Con-
gress intended to reach—making or using or selling in the United States
or importing into the United States, even if one or more of those activi-
ties also occur abroad.”128 The Federal Circuit also noted, “Territoriality
is satisfied when and only when any one of those domestic actions for that
unit (e.g., sale) is proved to be present, even if others of the listed activi-
116. Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., 807 F.3d 1283, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1288–89.
119. Id. at 1291.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1291–92.
123. Id. at 1292.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1302.
127. Id. at 1305.
128. Id. at 1306.
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ties for that unit (e.g., making, using) take place abroad.”129
The Federal Circuit found that it could not “say that a jury could not
find the chips to have been sold in the United States.”130 The Federal
Circuit found several factors that “suggest[ ] a substantial level of sales
activity by Marvell within the United States, even for chips manufac-
tured, delivered, and used entirely abroad.”131 For example, (1) Marvell’s
facilities were located in California; (2) Marvell “provided potential cus-
tomers with samples and simulations incorporating its designs” from its
California facility; and (3) “evidence suggest[ed] that specific contractual
commitments for specific volumes of chips were made in the United
States.”132 Furthermore, Marvell did not offer probative evidence to de-
feat the inference that the aforementioned contracts for chip sales were
executed in the United States.
Even so, there were chips that the Federal Circuit could not render a
decision on due to a lack of factual evidence.133 As a result, the Federal
Circuit concluded that a “partial new trial is needed to determine the
location, or perhaps locations, of the ‘sale’ of those chips.”134 The Federal
Circuit stipulated that “[t]o the extent . . . that the United States is such a
location of sale, chips not made in or imported into the United States
may be included in the past-royalty award and ongoing-royalty order.”135
C. INTER PARTES REVIEW
Inter partes review (IPR) filings have drastically increased over the past
year (see Chart 1 below).136 Two cases in particular, Cuozzo and MCM,
answered several legal questions regarding IPRs.137
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1309.
131. Id. at 1309–10.
132. Id. at 1309.
133. Id. at 1288.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics, USPTO (Nov. 30, 2015), http://
www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-11-30%20PTAB.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TPK3-TJWD].
137. See MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
cert. filed, No. 15-1330 (Apr. 29, 2016); In re Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
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Chart 1. Number of AIA Petitions Filed by Fiscal Year by Type138
In Cuozzo, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit made
several important rulings.139 First, the Federal Circuit found that 35
U.S.C. § 314(d) “prohibits review of the decision to institute IPR even
after a final decision.”140 Second, the Federal Circuit found that “Con-
gress implicitly approved the broadest reasonable interpretation standard
[for patent claim construction] in enacting the AIA” because “that stan-
dard has been applied in every PTO proceeding involving unexpired pat-
ents,” and “Congress in enacting the AIA was well aware that the
broadest reasonable interpretation standard was the prevailing rule.”141
Finally, the Federal Circuit found that “the test that a claim ‘is broader in
scope than the original claims if it contains within its scope any conceiva-
ble apparatus or process which would not have infringed the original pat-
ent’” applies not only “in the context of reissues and reexaminations,”
but also “in the context of IPRs.”142
In the second case, MCM, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit answered several questions pertaining to the authority of the U.S.
Patent Office (PTO), the authority of the court, and whether IPRs violate
Article III of the U.S. Constitution.143 The Federal Circuit held that it
cannot review the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (PTAB) decision of
whether to institute an IPR, but it “can review the question of whether
the final decision violates Article III and the Seventh Amendment.”144
The Federal Circuit held that “inter partes review provisions do not vio-
late Article III” as “Congress has the power to delegate disputes over
138. Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics, supra note 136.
139. See In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1273.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1276–78.
142. Id. at 1283.
143. MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlwett-Packard Co. 812 F.3d 1284, 1285 (Fed. Cir.
2015), cert. filed, No. 15-1330 (Apr. 29, 2016).
144. Id.
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public rights to non-Article III courts,” and because of prior Federal Cir-
cuit precedent.145 Finally, the Federal Circuit held that the “Seventh
Amendment poses no barrier to agency adjudication without a jury” be-
cause “patent rights are public rights, and their validity susceptible to re-
view by an administrative agency.”146
The Federal Circuit will continue to see more appeals of PTAB deci-
sions and issue opinions balancing fairness between petitioners and pat-
ent owners.147
III. COPYRIGHT UPDATE
A. SNIPPETS AND SEARCHES ARE FAIR USE—AUTHORS GUILD, INC.
V. GOOGLE, INC.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court’s determination in Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc. that Google’s
scanning, storage, and digital display of “snippets” of more than 20 mil-
lion searchable books is protected by the fair use defense under § 107 of
the Copyright Act.148 The success of a fair use defense is dependent upon
the following four factors: (1) “the purpose and character of the use”; (2)
“the nature of the copyrighted work”; (3) the “amount and substantiality
of the portion used” in comparison to “the copyrighted work as a whole”;
and (4) how the use affects the potential market or the “value of the
copyrighted work.”149 On appeal, the Authors Guild offered five separate
arguments why Google’s fair use defense should fail, each of which was
rejected by the Second Circuit.150
First, the Second Circuit found that Google’s use satisfied the first fac-
tor of the fair use analysis because it constituted a transformative use that
“communicate[d] something new and different from the original [work]
or expand[ed] its utility.”151 Specifically, scanning the books and enabling
users to “search for identification of books containing a term of interest”
was a transformative use because it “ma[d]e available significant informa-
tion about those books.”152 Additionally, enabling users to view a snippet
of the books recovered in their searches “adds importantly to the highly
transformative purpose of identifying books of interest to the
searcher.”153 The use of snippets allows “the searcher just enough context
surrounding the searched term to help her evaluate whether the book
falls within the scope of her interest (without revealing so much as to
145. Id. at 1289, 1291–92.
146. Id. at 1293.
147. See, e.g., Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
148. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207–08 (2d Cir. 2015).
149. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 212–13.
150. Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 207.
151. Id. at 214.
152. Id. at 216–17 (alteration in original).
153. Id. at 218.
2016] Intellectual Property Law 251
threaten the author’s copyright interests).”154 While Google is a for-profit
entity, a mere commercial motivation will not “outweigh a convincing
transformative purpose and absence of significant substitutive competi-
tion with the original.”155
The second factor carried little weight on its own, but favored Google
when the nature of the copyrighted work was assessed in conjunction
with the first factor.156 In discussing the third factor, the Second Circuit
acknowledged that Google’s program copies entire works but took care
to note that other “courts have rejected any categorical rule that a copy-
ing of the entirety [of a work] cannot be a fair use.”157 This factor turned
on the fact that Google “does not reveal th[e] digital copy to the public”
and that “the snippet view does not reveal matter that offers the market-
place a significantly competing substitute for the copyrighted work.”158
Google limits the amount of the book shown, blacklists approximately
22% of a book from a user’s view, and utilizes other built-in restrictions
that operate to prevent a searcher from accessing more than randomly
scattered sections of any book.159
Finally, the fourth factor weighed heavily in Google’s favor because the
snippets are not an effective substitute for the original work, “[e]specially
in view of the . . . normal purchase price of a book [compared to] the cost
of manpower needed to secure an arbitrary assortment of randomly scat-
tered snippets.”160 The Second Circuit recognized that some level of lost
sales could result from Google’s snippet function, but that fact did not
transform Google’s use into an effective substitute for the original
work.161
The Authors Guild argued that Google has prevented the copyright
owners from exercising and maintaining derivative rights in their
works.162 The Second Circuit, however, responded that copyright in a
work “does not include an exclusive right to furnish the kind of informa-
tion about the works that Google’s programs provide to the public.”163
Rather, derivative rights allow authors to prevent their work from being
converted to a different form, not to prevent other parties from “al-
low[ing] the public to obtain limited data about the contents of the book,
without allowing any substantial reading of its text.”164
The Second Circuit also pointed to Google’s highly protected and con-
fidential database to find that the risk of hacking of Google’s files was
154. Id.
155. Id. at 219.
156. Id. at 220.
157. Id. at 221.
158. Id. at 221–22.
159. Id. at 222.
160. Id. at 224.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 225.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 226.
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insufficient to support the Authors Guild’s claims.165 Finally, Google’s
furnishing of digital copies of the works to the libraries that provided the
print-version in the first place did not constitute infringement because
Google conditioned the furnishing of the digital copy on the library
agreeing to only use them in a “non-infringing fair use manner.”166 The
Second Circuit concluded that Google’s program of digitizing millions of
books, enabling searching of the content of the books, and displaying
small snippets of the books was a highly transformative use that did not
provide effective substitutes for the original works and that Google’s
commercial motivations did not justify rejecting the fair use defense.167
B. DOES THE BLANKET COVER THE STREAM?—PANDORA MEDIA,
INC. V. ASCAP
In the midst of an ever-increasing number of famous music artists and
owners pulling their content from new online streaming platforms (e.g.,
Pandora and Spotify) and disputes arising over royalty rates, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit tendered a big win for the
streaming company Pandora.168 The Second Circuit found that the Amer-
ican Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) and other
music publishers could not selectively offer blanket licenses covering
their music libraries to negotiate higher royalty rates.169
ASCAP is an organization that licenses the right to make public per-
formances of the works of nearly “half of all composers and music pub-
lishers in the United States.”170 Due to the sheer size of the performing
rights organization, it is subject to a judicial decree that mandates how it
operates and offers licenses to parties wishing to publicly perform musical
works (e.g., restaurants, stores, hotels, etc.).171 The decree requires AS-
CAP, upon receipt of a written-request, to grant a non-exclusive license
to publicly perform ASCAP’s entire library of works.172
In response to growing concern revolving around low royalty rates re-
ceived by ASCAP from certain online streaming companies, such as Pan-
dora, several copyright owners threatened to withdraw all content from
ASCAP.173 The owners demanded that ASCAP allow them to selectively
decide which parties ASCAP licensed their works to and which parties
the owners dealt with personally and apart from ASCAP.174 In response,
ASCAP allowed some copyright owners to withdraw the rights to per-
form their works from some media performers (such as Pandora), but not
165. Id. at 228.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 229.
168. See Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers, 785
F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2015).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 75–76.
172. Id. at 76.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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others, despite the blanket license provision in ASCAP’s judicial
decree.175
In affirming the district court, the Second Circuit found that the prac-
tice of allowing content owners to selectively decide whether to license
their works through ASCAP directly violated the plain words of the judi-
cial decree, which “unambiguously precludes ASCAP from accepting
such partial withdrawals.”176 Because ASCAP must offer its entire reper-
tory under all blanket licenses, “publishers may not license works to AS-
CAP for licensing to some eligible users but not others.”177 While this
holding currently favors Pandora and other new streaming platforms, in-
dividual content owners may refrain from contracting with ASCAP in the
future and attempt to negotiate individually with the Pandoras of the
world—if they have the funds to do so.
The Second Circuit also affirmed the rate determination made by the
district court, despite ASCAP’s arguments for an escalating rate.178 It
held that a “1.85% rate was reasonable for the duration of the Pandora-
ASCAP license” especially since ASCAP failed to prove that its pro-
posed rate was reasonable.179
IV. TRADEMARK UPDATE
A. DISTRICT COURT ISSUE PRECLUSION CAN ARISE OUT
OF THE BOARD—B & B HARDWARE, INC. V.
HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC.
In B & B Hardware v. Hargis Industries, the U.S. Supreme Court de-
termined whether issue preclusion applies in the context of trademark
law when parties are engaged in disputes before both the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board (TTAB) and a district court regarding the same marks
and issues.180 In 1993, B&B registered the mark SEALTIGHT for metal
fasteners to be used in the aerospace industry. Three years later, Hargis
attempted to procure a trademark registration for the mark SEALTITE,
also for metal fasteners, for use in the construction industry. Promptly
after the USPTO published Hargis’ application, B&B opposed Hargis’
SEALTITE application, arguing that the mark would likely cause confu-
sion among the consuming public, one basis for opposing the registration
of a mark under the Lanham Act.181
In an opposition proceeding before the TTAB, the TTAB will deter-
mine existence of a likelihood of confusion between two marks using the
factors laid out in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.182 For example,
175. Id.
176. Id. at 77.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 78.
179. Id.
180. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1299 (2015).
181. Id. at 1301; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012).
182. B & B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1301.
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the TTAB considered whether B&B’s mark resembled Hargis’ applied-
for mark, whether the goods and services offered under the two marks
were similar, and whether there was evidence of actual consumer confu-
sion, along with other factors.183 Based primarily on the similarity of the
marks themselves and the goods at issue, the TTAB held that Hargis’
SEALTITE mark was too similar to B&B’s existing SEALTIGHT mark
that it created a likelihood of confusion among consumers and thus
granted B&B’s opposition and denied registration to Hargis.184
During the pendency of the action before the TTAB, B&B also filed an
action for trademark infringement in the district court.185 When a party
brings a separate infringement action, the district court will perform its
own likelihood of confusion analysis using a set of factors consistent with
the law in the circuit where the court sits.186 While the federal action was
pending, the TTAB issued its holding in favor of B&B.187 In response,
B&B argued that the TTAB’s decision should have “preclusive effect” in
the district court because the issue of likelihood of confusion had already
been decided.188 The district court rejected B&B’s argument of preclu-
sion on the basis that the Board is not an Article III court and therefore
its decisions can have no bearing on the decisions of a federal court.189
The jury returned a finding of no likelihood of confusion and B&B
appealed.190
Contrary to the district court’s finding, the Eighth Circuit found that an
agency decision could have preclusive effect on a subsequent court pro-
ceeding.191 The Eigth Circuit, however, held that the differences in the
analysis performed by the TTAB and the district court prevented a find-
ing of issue preclusion in this instance.192 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether and under what conditions an agency de-
cision could “ground issue preclusion.”193
Addressing initially whether an “agency decision can ever ground issue
preclusion,” the Supreme Court relied on the Restatement of Judgments
to find that it was “clear that issue preclusion is not limited to those situa-
tions in which the same issue is before two courts. Rather, where a single
issue is before a court and an administrative agency, preclusion also often
applies.”194 The Supreme Court rejected Hargis’ argument that such a
reading of the Lanham Act would be inconsistent with the Seventh
183. Id. at 1302.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1296, 1302.
186. Id. at 1305.







194. Id. at 1302–03.
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Amendment’s right to a jury trial and Article III of the Constitution.195
The Supreme Court further stated that a finding that issue preclusion is
unavailable for an agency decision would “conflict with [its] prece-
dent.”196 Finally, the Supreme Court noted that the plain language of the
Lanham Act “does not forbid issue preclusion.”197
After finding that issue preclusion could be grounded in an agency de-
cision, the Supreme Court turned to the Eighth Circuit’s holding that is-
sue preclusion nevertheless did not apply because the factors used by the
district court in an infringement action were different from those em-
ployed by the TTAB in a registration proceeding.198 The Supreme Court
found to the contrary, holding instead that the “same likelihood-of-confu-
sion standard applies” despite the fact “that registration and infringement
are governed by different statutory provisions.”199 The Supreme Court
was careful to advise that in some situations, a district court would con-
sider different usages of a mark in its likelihood of confusion analysis
than those before the TTAB.200 In those situations, it will be necessary to
determine whether the two tribunals considered usages that were “mate-
rially the same” to decide whether issue preclusion will apply.201 There-
fore, issue preclusion will not always apply in concurrent or subsequent
district court proceedings regarding the same issues, but where “the other
ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met, when the usages adjudi-
cated by the TTAB are materially the same as those before the district
court, issue preclusion should apply.”202
The effects of this holding remain to be seen. While the Supreme Court
issued a narrow holding applicable to a finite set of trademark opposition
proceedings where the usages considered by the TTAB and the district
court are materially the same, it is likely that parties will latch onto and
dispute what actually constitutes usages that are “materially the same.”203
In those situations, the decision to seek de novo review at the district
court level, as opposed to appealing a TTAB decision directly to the Fed-
eral Circuit, should be seriously and methodically analyzed. Although the
Supreme Court also limited its holding in the context of trademark law, it
is likely that parties will attempt to apply the ruling in the patent context,
as well.
195. Id. at 1304.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1305.
198. Id. at 1306.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1308.
201. Id. (stating that “[i]f a mark owner uses its mark in ways that are materially the
same as the usages included in its registration application, then the TTAB is deciding the
same likelihood-of-confusion issue as a district court in infringement litigation. By contrast,
if a mark owner uses its mark in ways that are materially unlike the usages in the applica-
tion, then the TTAB is not deciding the same issue.”).
202. Id. at 1310.
203. See id. at 1308.
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B. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DISPARAGE—IN RE TAM
In December 2015, an en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit handed down In re Tam, a decision that has the potential to inval-
idate an entire provision of the Lanham Act.204 The case revolves around
the USPTO’s denial of a trademark registration for the mark THE
SLANTS for an Asian-American rock band based on its likelihood to
disparage individuals of Asian descent, in violation of § 2(a) of the Lan-
ham Act.205
The Lanham Act provides that a trademark may be refused to be regis-
tered if it “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous
matter; or matter which may disparage.”206 In determining whether a
mark disparages a person or a group of people, the USPTO considers
whether a “substantial composite” of the referenced group would find the
mark to be disparaging in relation to the goods or services offered under
the mark and modern attitudes.207 Regarding THE SLANTS, the trade-
mark examiner found the mark to be disparaging, a decision that was
affirmed by the TTAB.208 On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the applicant
(Mr. Tam) argued that the provision allowing the USPTO to deny regis-
tration of a mark as disparaging violated Mr. Tam’s First Amendment
right to free speech.209 The three-judge panel found that its “binding pre-
cedent foreclosed Mr. Tam’s [constitutionality] arguments” and affirmed
the USPTO’s refusal of registration.210 Surprisingly, the Federal Circuit
sua sponte ordered en banc review of the case.211
In a landmark decision authored by Judge Moore, the Federal Circuit
moved away from its prior decision in In re McGinley212 and found that
the disparagement provision of § 2(a) was unconstitutional on its face.213
Significantly, the Federal Circuit held that the provision “denies impor-
tant legal rights to private speech,” and therefore applied a strict scrutiny
analysis, the highest level of constitutional review.214 First, the Federal
Circuit noted that the disparagement provision was neither “[c]ontent or
[v]iewpoint [n]eutral” nor “narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests.”215 The Federal Circuit found that, rather than enacting the dis-
paragement provision to serve compelling state interests, the government
204. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Notably, the Federal Circuit initi-
ated sua sponte the en banc review of the case. Id. at 1334.
205. Id. at 1327–28.
206. Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
207. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1330–31.
208. Id. at 1331–32.
209. Id. at 1333.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1334.
212. 660 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
213. Id. at 1357.
214. Id. at 1334.
215. Id.
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only enacted the provision to restrict speech with which it disagrees.216
The Federal Circuit also rejected the government’s argument that strict
scrutiny was an improper standard because trademarks constitute com-
mercial speech.217 Instead, the Federal Circuit found that while trade-
marks do serve commercial functions, it is the “expressive character [of a
mark], not its ability to serve as a source identifier, that is the basis for the
disparagement exclusion from registration.”218 Therefore, a refusal to
register a mark for being disparaging equates to “a determination by the
government that the expressive content of the message is unsuitable.”219
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit discussed the standard if the speech
were to be considered commercial and held that the provision still would
not survive.”220
The Federal Circuit also found that the provision has a chilling effect
on private speech because the denial of benefits associated with a trade-
mark registration “creates a serious disincentive to adopt a mark which
the government may deem offensive or disparaging.”221 Additionally, the
Federal Circuit pointed to the inconsistent application of the provision by
giving examples of similar marks where one was denied registration for
being disparaging and the other was allowed.222 After rejecting argu-
ments that trademark registrations amount to government speech or are
government subsidies to which strict scrutiny does not apply, the Federal
Circuit held that “[a]ll of the government’s proffered interests boil down
to permitting the government to burden speech it finds offensive” and
that the provision is unconstitutional.223
Notably, the Federal Circuit limited its holding to the disparagement
portion of § 2(a), but left open the possibility that “other portions of § 2
may likewise constitute government regulation of expression based on
message, such as the exclusion of immoral or scandalous marks.”224
Based on the Federal Circuit’s analysis of the disparagement provision, it
is likely that in a subsequent case, the Federal Circuit would also hold
other portions of § 2(a) equally unconstitutional. Three judges authored
powerful dissents, at least in part, attacking the majority’s freedom of
speech analysis and offering their own discussions on U.S. Supreme
Court precedent.225 Two found that the disparagement provision is un-
constitutional, at least in some situations, while the third dissent, written
216. Id. at 1336. The Federal Circuit noted that “the government enacted and continues
to defend § 2(a) ‘because of disagreement with the message [disparaging marks] convey.’”
Id. (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011)).
217. Id. at 1337–38.
218. Id. at 1338.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1355.
221. Id. at 1341.
222. Id. at 1342 n.7 (“The PTO denied the mark HAVE YOU HEARD SATAN IS
REPUBLICAN because it disparaged the Republican Party . . . but did not find the mark
THE DEVIL IS A DEMOCRAT disparaging.”).
223. Id. at 1355–57.
224. Id. at 1330 n.1.
225. See, e.g., id. at 1374 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
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by Judge Reyna, would have found a substantial government interest in
advancing and protecting the “orderly flow of commerce.”226
There is a good chance that the U.S. Supreme Court will weigh in on
the issue, since the closely followed Washington Redskin’s case, Pro-
Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse,227 attacking the cancellation of pro-football
team’s REDSKINS registration, is currently pending before the Fourth
Circuit. The issue will be especially ripe for review if the Fourth Circuit
goes the opposite way and finds the disparagement provision constitu-
tional in light of the First Amendment. On the other hand, if the Supreme
Court decides not to review the en banc Federal Circuit decision, it is
likely that Congress will initiate attempts to revise the relevant section of
the Lanham Act.
V. WHAT PRACTIONERS SHOULD WATCH FOR IN 2016
The U.S. Supreme Court will and has already been active in the intel-
lectual property field in 2016, having granted certiorari in two IP cases.228
In patents, the Supreme Court determined (in consolidated cases) that
the two-part test for enhanced damages, established by the Federal Cir-
cuit in In re Seagate Technology, LLC,229 was inconsistent with 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 and that “there is ‘no precise rule or formula’ for awarding damages
under § 284.”230 The Supreme Court also considered whether a district
court has discretion to award enhanced damages based on intentional and
knowing copying of a patented invention by an infringer under 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 and found that the district court is free to award enhanced damages
without “any rigid formula.”231 In Octane Fitness, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a finding of “exceptional” for determining whether a
party is entitled to attorney’s fees can be made when the case “is simply
one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of
a party’s litigating position,” as opposed to the rigid test used by the Fed-
eral Circuit.232 As a result, district courts have more flexibility in handling
cases before them, to achieve equity in patent disputes.
It is likely that the Federal Circuit will continue to see a vast number of
IPR appeals, providing an important check against patent owner con-
cerns that the pendulum has swung too far in killing patents properly
issued by the Office.
Copyright practitioners will want to be aware of the ongoing battle be-
tween content owners and new media platforms that seek to make the
226. Id. at 1376 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
227. See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 447–48 (E.D. Va. 2015).
228. See Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 356, 356–57 (2015); Halo Elec., Inc.,
v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
229. 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
230. Stryker, 136 S. Ct. at 356; Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1932 (quoting Octane Fitness, LLC v.
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014)).
231. See Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649, 660–61 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Halo
Elec., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated by, 136 S. Ct.
1928 (2016).
232. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756.
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artistic works available to the public. Despite Pandora’s recent success in
the Second Circuit, the online radio provider was not as lucky against
Broadcast Music, Inc., when a district court imposed a 2.5% royalty rate
increase from the 1.75% Pandora had previously paid.233 Additionally,
content owners may increasingly negotiate with individual media plat-
forms and pull their works from large music publishers like ASCAP.
Practitioners should also be on the lookout for the impending decision
from the Fourth Circuit in the Redskins Case.234 A potential circuit split
could certainly set the cases up for Supreme Court intervention. If the
Supreme Court affirms the Federal Circuit or denies review, the USPTO
could expect an influx of “spirited” mark applications and potential ac-
tion by Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION
Developments during the Survey period continue to clarify the scope
of intellectual property rights and liability for infringement. For example,
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kimble provides certainty that pat-
ent royalties cannot go past the life of the patent, while the Supreme
Court’s decision in Commil solidifies that there is not an additional de-
fense to induced infringement.235 Furthermore, Intellectual Ventures pro-
vided guidance on patent eligible subject matter under Alice, while Teva
provided guidance on which standard of review to apply during claim
construction.236 The rise of the PTAB has led to quicker and more effi-
cient resolution of patent validity. In Authors Guild, the boundaries of
fair use in copyright were tested, while in trademark, it is now clear that
in the appropriate context, a TTAB ruling on an issue can have preclusive
effect in subsequent district court proceedings.237 In summary, the Survey
period reflects changes in the law that, although not fundamental, result
in greater certainty and efficiency in resolving IP disputes.
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2015).
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2015).
235. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2406–07 (2015); Commil USA,
LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1929 (2015).
236. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1336,
1366–67 (2015); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015).
237. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 2015); B & B Hard-
ware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1302 (2015).
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